In a nationally televised broadcast on Wednesday, President Bush spelled out his plan for sending 21,500 more troops to Iraq. There are several problems with this plan:

1) 70% of Americans oppose the plan, including the party that now controls Congress.

2) The Iraqi Government doesn't like the plan either.

“The government believes there is no need for extra troops from the American side,” Haidar al-Abadi, a Parliament member and close associate of Mr. Maliki, said Wednesday. “The existing troops can do the job.”

Those two problems are huge and difficult to overcome. But the biggest potential problem isn't the American troops - it's a condition that is being forced upon the Iraqi government and the way it is going to be carried out.

17,500 of these new troops are supposed to be concentrated in the Baghdad area. If this sounds familiar to you, it is. Last August Bush announced Operation Together Forward II. The idea was to pull in about 15,000 American troops to Baghdad from elsewhere in Iraq to reduce the increasing level of violence there. It was supposed to be led by Iraqi troops, but with American support, just like this latest plan. The plan was a disaster.

"The results of Operation Together Forward II are disheartening. Violence in Baghdad—already at high levels—jumped more than 43 percent between the summer and October 2006. U.S. forces continue to suffer high casualties."

- Iraq Study Group report

This was the fourth attempt to pacify Baghdad since the occupation started.
Given this experience, why should even the delusional Bush Administration expect different results this time? Most experts from the middle east consider the increase in the size of the force is a "drop in the ocean". However this time there is a new twist, that sort of makes sense if you don't think about it too hard.

American troops, Shiite leaders say, should stay out of Shiite neighborhoods and focus on fighting Sunni insurgents.
[...]
American officials have warned that with lessening American oversight, Shiite leaders might shift to a sectarian strategy that punished Sunni insurgents but spared Shiite militias.

The Iraqi government is dominated by the Shiite community, as everyone knows. Since they are 60% of the population it was unavoidable.

Those same Shiite politicians owe their jobs to political blocks that are either dominated by or linked to violent militias such as the Mahdi Army and Badr Brigade. Every expert on Iraq, even the Bush Administration, agrees that these militias are two of the largest actors in the out-of-control sectarian violence that plagues Iraq. To control the sectarian violence these militias must be dealt with. But the Iraqi government is largely unable to deal with them because they owe their jobs to them. Hence the failure of Operation Together Forward II. These sectarian divisions, which were never a large issue in Iraq's history before 1991 (except for the Kurds), have now become a dominant feature in Iraq.

When Saddam Hussein was hanged, no one in the unruly crowd shouted "Long live Iraq!" or mentioned the president of the country, Nuri al-Maliki. Instead they chanted "Moktada! Moktada! Moktada!," the name of the radical Shiite cleric, Moktada al-Sadr.

That moment symbolizes the dismal failure of President Bush's attempts to strengthen the central government in Baghdad and reconcile Iraq's warring factions. His latest "way forward" - more troops, more aid, more resolve by the Maliki government - is almost certainly doomed as well, and for one simple reason.

There is no national identity in Iraq, no loyalty to a common national purpose. American soldiers are fighting and dying every day under a flag they believe in. But that's not true for their Iraqi counterparts. Like the guards at the hanging, Iraqis are devoted to their tribes, to their religious groups, to individual chieftains like Moktada. Not to their country.

If that wasn't bad enough, there is another problem to controlling these militias - the Iraqi army. An estimated 80 percent of Iraq's army is Shiite. Which brings us back to Bush's dilemma. The American public wants either immediate progress on Iraq, and a withdraw from Iraq. The root cause of the problems in Iraq are issues that Iraqi politicians don't want to deal with, and the Iraqi army can't be trusted to accomplish. What to do?

Iraq's prime minister has told Shiite militiamen to surrender their weapons or face an all-out assault, part of a commitment President Bush outlined on Wednesday to bring violence under control with a more aggressive Iraqi Army and 21,500 additional American troops.

Senior Iraqi officials said Wednesday that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, under pressure from the U.S., has agreed to crack down on the fighters even though they are loyal to his most powerful political ally, the radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

But where would these Iraqi troops come from? They would come from the other 20%.

In preparation for the new security plan, the Iraqi military will bring two brigades from northern Iraq, a region largely populated by Kurds, and one from the south.

An Iraqi general, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to disclose details of the plan, said a mainly Kurdish force would be sent into the Sadr City slum in northeast Baghdad, which serves as headquarters of the Mahdi Army.

The general said Kurds, who are Sunni but not Arab, were being used against the Shiite militia because soldiers from other Iraqi units were likely to refuse to fight fellow Shiites.

Kurds are Sunnis, just like the the religious group that has fought the occupation in western Iraq (and is increasingly supported by Saudi Arabia). However, they are not arab, like the rest of Iraq.

Up to this point Kurdistan, practically a sovereign nation of its own, has been peaceful (except for the Kirkuk area). There is real fear in the Kurdish region that this new action will draw the Kurds into the civil war raging in the rest of Iraq.

After a number of conflicting statements by different Kurdish party and government officials, it is clear now, contrary to Barzni’s statement, Peshmerge forces will be sent to Baghdad to become “victims” in the words of Barzani. Barzani also made it clear that Peshmerge forces are not trained to provide security of Baghdad.

The prospect of sending Kurdish Peshmarga to Baghdad to provide security to this war torn city has immense implications for future inter-communal relationship as well as drawing Kurds into a raging civil war. From the early reports it is apparent that once again this decision has been made by political parties rather than the Kurdish National Assembly.

Given the level of sectarian violence in Baghdad, it seems extremely doubtful that a Sunni Kurdish army would be welcomed into a heavily armed Shiite Arab neighborhood with anything but bullets and explosives. The Kurdish/American army is sure to respond with bullets and explosives of their own. Then what?

This situation puts almost everyone involved in a very difficult situation.

1) It puts Iraqi politicians in an untenable situation. Influential elements of the Iraqi government are certain to demand an end to the offense. But without American support can the Iraqi politicians assure their own safety? If the move into Sadr City turns bloody the most likely outcome is a collapse of the Iraqi government.

What then? Remember that it took nearly six months to form the current government. Another government coalition will probably take even longer to form. That will crush any hopes of a political resolution in Iraq year, making an end to the Iraq War before the 2008 elections practically impossible.

More importantly, the most radical elements of the Shiite community will find themselves fighting the Iraqi and American armies. It could cause the entire Iraqi south to go from chaotic and violent to full-scale rebellion.

2) Kurdish politicians will get immense pressure from the population of Kurdistan to pull the troops back. They will most likely demand critical concessions from the Iraqi government for continuing participation - namely Kirkuk.

Bringing Kirkuk into Kurdistan has been the top agenda item for the Kurds since the early 1970s. For the first time in Iraq's history, the Iraqi government needs the Kurds. They are likely to bend on this issue.

However, Turkey violently opposes an independent Kurdistan, and Kurds having exclusive access to an ethnically-cleansed Kirkuk oil will do that.

Just to complicate the issue even more, Bush decided that now was a great time to raid the Iranian consulate in Arbil, Kurdistan.

An Iraqi Kurdish security official said Thursday that US forces who raided the Iranian consulate in the Iraqi northern city of Erbil had no right to conduct the raid.

The government of Iraqi Kurdistan was in no way informed of the storming of the Iranian consulate by US forces, he said, adding that the region's security forces were cognizant of the legal activities of the Iranian consulate.

At this point it is good to remember the 16-year cycle of treachery.

The United States abandoned the Kurds in 1975 and again in 1991. Sixteen years separated these first two betrayals. Another 16 years have elapsed, and America may be on the verge of another betrayal, however unintended and inadvertent, of the residents of Iraqi Kurdistan.

3) The Bush Administration and the Republican Party have "doubled down" on this war. Against all the polls, the electoral results, the Democratic Party, and even moderate voices in their own party, they have decided to risk what is left of their political capital on this very questionable military strategy. If it fails as badly as Operation Together Forward did it may split the Republican Party. If it collapses the Iraqi Government and causes the Shiites to join the insurgency en mass, we could look at a full scale meltdown in the GOP.

The only group sure to gain from this situation would be the Sunni insurgency.
American troops engaged with the Shiite community would be their gain. A collapse of the Shiite-led government also couldn't hurt the Sunni cause.